Location:

Red Deer

Date:

October 25, 2000

Number of Participants:

6

Other Locations:

October 17 Leduc
October 18 Drayton Valley
October 19 Rocky Mountain House
October 23 Sundre
October 24 Grande Prairie
October 25 Red Deer
October 26 Calgary
October 30 Pincher Creek

Summary Aboriginal

Summary Response Forms

MEETING NOTES

1. Development Planning

Coordination of surface and subsurface planning and development

  • Seismic work needs to be better coordinated: This seems impossible because of the competitive nature of the work (company spends money, finds a pool, and doesn't want to tell anyone about it). Freelancers get information and sell it. Then someone else comes and does the work again. AB Resources is now responsible for this, but maybe it should be under the EUB's mandate. This is related to public health & safety because a good seismic picture gives more choices about where wells and facilities are located. There is a heightened concern for health and safety because there is heightened activity, and seismic is part of that heightened activity.
  • Seismic issues should all be under one department. Lands & Forest, AB Environment should look after seismic holes. Landowners get the runaround when issues arise.
  • Seismic regulations are very lax. They should be stricter ie. plugging top to bottom before blasting. Waterton incident could happen here.

Coordination of planning and development of subsurface resources

  • no comment

2. EUB Role

Content of regulations

  • Pipelines should be linologged instead of waiting for accidents. Currently there are 2 pipeline leaks per day. More prevention is needed, and more regulations regarding pipelines - especially sour pipelines, but also oil pipelines near river crossings. Many towns get their drinking water from the river.

Effectiveness of the field surveillance system and other enforcement measures

  • Question: what inspections currently take place at facilities and wells?
  • There are some excellent companies. They should be rewarded. Others aren't good.

Application and decision process

  • There are trade-offs between exposure time and concentration of H2S. Therefore sour gas facilities should be licensed for different periods of time depending on their concentration. Higher concentration facilities get shorter licenses. Farmers are there for a lifetime and so have a long exposure time. Even a low concentration over 40 or 50 years in the same location is bad. Incineration does not result in 100% combustion, and people smell it.

Relationship with Stakeholders

  • No comments

3. Monitoring

  • Pipelines should be linologged instead of waiting for accidents.
  • Many sour pipes don't have any monitoring. Technology is available. It should be mandatory to be preventative so that industry will use available technology.
  • Pipelines are aging and they are not being monitored. They are under highways everywhere.

4. Jurisdiction

  • Seismic issues should all be under one department. For example, looking after holes. Landowners get the runaround when issues arise.

5. Industry Procedures and Personnel

  • Question: if test flaring is done to check a well, why do some companies flare for 4 or 5 years?

6. Emergency Response Planning and Preparedness

  • No comments

7. Understanding Health Effects

  • Health issues are long-term and difficult to monitor. For example, reproductive health effects and cancer. Generations ago there wasn't such a high incidence, but many things have changed. It is difficult to know the cause.
  • Would be better to study rats instead of people.
  • A recent study was done by Allied Signal. They gathered data on rat exposure to H2S. When plotting lethal exposure vs. exposure time it is evident that if exposure is long enough the lethal concentration reaches zero. There is no safe limit. Such a study can't be done on humans, and so we need to look at the Lodgepole incident.
  • Two studies were done regarding Lodgepole. First study showed a significant increase in birth defects in the greater Edmonton area after Lodgepole. The second study broke this down to examine different types of birth defects. As a result the statistical significance was lost. This study has been more widely publicized by government because it is not statistically significant. This is similar to the Pincher Creek study. Not enough people to be statistically significant. Therefore they can say there is no proof that H2S causes such effects.
  • Concerns for sensitive people. One lady drives to Calgary and gets blisters on her hands from the air. This has been happening over the last two years. 'Average' statements aren't good enough. The problem must be eliminated.
  • There is a trade off between safety and investment.
  • Less studies and more action: H2S and S02 are not acceptable to human lungs. Don't study it and monitor it, just make sure there is less of it. Technology should be used to eliminate it. There are too many studies. Spontaneous abortions occur at low concentrations of H2S. It causes problems for animals and humans. Expert says that sulfur in fuel causes so many deaths, and yet we have 30 times more sulfur in our fuel compared to California.
  • Studies and models are a waste of time. Different people have different resistance. It is not good in any amount. Must strive to have less.
  • Less is better, get there quicker!!! There are cumulative effects in the environment. Too much suffering. There has been progress, but we must strive more quickly.
  • What is the point of committees and studies when we know it is not good? Why study how much is OK?
  • Committee member clarified that the Committee wants more research so that they can better communicate the effects, not so they can know how much they can expose people to. The Committee also wants lower levels of H2S, S02, etc. in the environment.
  • RE: CAPP Brochure that says no member of the public has been killed by sour gas: How can they know? There are abortions and miscarriages also. The statement in the brochure is misleading.

8. Technical Knowledge

Dispersion modeling

  • Dispersion modeling is not effective because of non-uniform land and wind variance. Can't capture sporadic episodes that have the most impact on people's lives. May not be worthwhile to do much more work on dispersion modeling for health & safety purposes. You will get an answer from the models, but it is not an answer that can be used. You can model, but you can't predict. Statistics will make it unknowable, therefore why bother doing it?

Risk assessment

  • There is no good human answer to how much is safe. Need to do animal studies and modify them for humans. The factor of safety is a political factor, not a technical factor. For example, if we decide to accept zero risk, the industry will be gone. As acceptable risk changes, some investment will disappear, and economics will change. It all has to come down to money for the companies.

9. Setbacks

Criteria for setbacks

  • It is impossible to come up with a good technical answer for setbacks, so guess! You may find an economic answer, or a psychological answer for appropriate setback distance, but now a technical answer. Setbacks involve balancing the different concerns (economic, safety, psychological effects, etc)

Effects of setbacks

  • Question: are people limited from expanding based on setbacks? It is difficult for landowners to predict so far ahead. Setbacks may affect them years down the road, for example, if they wish to expand their feed lot or something else.

10. Public Consultation by Industry

  • No comments

11. Public Awareness and Education

  • No comments

12. Aboriginal Issues

  • No comments

13. Implementation

  • No comments

14. Non-mandate but Important Issues

Water quality is also very important!!!! An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.